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<![CDATA[The Anomaly of Good-Looking : The Relationship between Spirituality and Extremism on Hadith and Social Religious Perspective ]]>
<![CDATA[Alwi, Zulfahmi]]>;
<![CDATA[Akbar, Akbar]]>;
<![CDATA[Hady, Amin]]>;
<![CDATA[Amir, Abdul Muiz]]>;
<![CDATA[Dakir, Jawiah]]>;
<![CDATA[Majid, Latifah Abdul]]>
<![CDATA[ QIJIS Vol 9, No 2 (2021) ]]>
Publisher : <![CDATA[IAIN Kudus ]]>
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DOI: 10.21043/qijis.v9i2.10476
<![CDATA[The stereotype of Islam as an extremist religion is often associated with adherence in a good-looking character to the practices of ritual piety. This study aims to discuss the Hadith that allegedly refers to the presence of good-looking phenomenon from the prophetic period. The study uses a descriptive qualitative research design which relates to the basis of critical analysis through an interdisciplinary approach combining isnÄd-cum-matn and socio-religious phenomenology. The results indicate that the Hadith good-looking is á¹£aḥīḥ (authentic) based on the review of its sanad transmission and examination on its matn. The good-looking trait is attributable to the emptiness of morality in the practice of Islamic spirituality. This vacuity is induced by religious insights focused solely on theological and normative viewpoints. The solution is to spread moral teaching and moderate religious values proactively through different methods and techniques, such as virtual proselytizing in social media.]]>
<![CDATA[Digital Philanthropy: The Practice of Giving Among Middle to Upper-Class Muslim in Indonesia and Soft Capitalism ]]>
<![CDATA[Triantoro, Dony Arung]]>;
<![CDATA[Wahyuni, Tri]]>;
<![CDATA[Purna, Fitra Prasapawidya]]>
<![CDATA[ QIJIS Vol 9, No 2 (2021) ]]>
Publisher : <![CDATA[IAIN Kudus ]]>
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DOI: 10.21043/qijis.v9i2.7814
<![CDATA[Academic discussions on transforming the culture of giving have shifted from direct assistance to long-term empowerment programs due to technology, communication, and informatics development. Therefore, this research aims to describe the practice of digital philanthropy in e-commerce and social enterprises. Data were collected from online-based e-commerce and social enterprise companies in Indonesia that have provided digital giving practice spaces through virtual ethnographic methods, interviews, and online documentation in Indonesia. These platforms include Bukalapak.com, Tokopedia.com, Sedekahonline.com, and kitabisa.com. The results provide an overview to the Muslim community on the practice of digital philanthropy. In addition, this research also provides an overview of the importance of building partners and program campaigns for the digital financial services industry and Islamic philanthropic institutions.]]>
<![CDATA[Islamic Popul[ar]ism: Religious Popularism and Activism in the Yukngaji Community ]]>
<![CDATA[Duraesa, M. Abzar]]>;
<![CDATA[Ahyar, Muzayyin]]>
<![CDATA[ QIJIS Vol 9, No 2 (2021) ]]>
Publisher : <![CDATA[IAIN Kudus ]]>
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DOI: 10.21043/qijis.v9i2.7795
<![CDATA[The increase of Islamic populism is in line with a massive spread of popular culture bringing Islamic symbols. This condition has brought a proliferation of Islamic activism which promotes its discourse with popular styles familiar to millennials. YukNgaji community, which is popularly emerging on social media, is one of the Islamic movements arising from this condition. This article examines how popular culture works in creating a discourse of Islamic activism in the YukNgaji online movement. This fieldwork uses a socio-political approach to analyze the proliferation of the YukNgaji movement in various areas driven by millennials. Some of the informants’ field data and experiences were obtained through an ethnographic method. Besides, some data on Islamic activism discourse amplified by YukNgaji was obtained from screenshots in YukNgaji.id movement’s Instagram accounts. This article finds the relationship between Islamic discourse by YukNgaji activists and popular cultural narratives. According to the finding of this article, it reveals that the phenomenon of millennial Islamic movements can be read within the scope of Islamic populism and activism in Indonesia by two important things. First, the YukNgaji movement campaigns for Islamic discourse through popular culture. Second, the YukNgaji movement tends to create a group with a common Islamic identity, which is voiced through the concept of hijra.]]>
<![CDATA[Muslim Religiosity in a Challenging Secular State of Singapore ]]>
<![CDATA[Helmiati, Helmiati]]>
<![CDATA[ QIJIS Vol 9, No 2 (2021) ]]>
Publisher : <![CDATA[IAIN Kudus ]]>
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DOI: 10.21043/qijis.v9i2.8026
<![CDATA[This article aims to examine the religiosity of Muslim minority living in a Singapore secular state. This survey research draws on Stark and Glock‘s model of multidimensional religiosity while accommodating specific characteristics of Islamic piety in framing the religiosity. From 482 Singaporean Muslims participated in this survey, this study found that the majority of Singaporean Muslims are quite religious. The finding indicates that religion is a core of their identity and a significant component of their life in spite of living in a secular state. This study argues that Muslim’s religious commitment can coexist within a secular framework due to Singapore secularism’s unique nature. Similarly, it also asserts that Singaporean Muslims negotiate a prudent balance between their civil responsibilities as Singaporeans and their religious obligations as Muslims. This study implies that secularism is multifaceted in relation to different cultural, political milieus, and different religions. Thus, secularism should not always be crudely viewed as categorical resistance against religion.]]>
<![CDATA[Regimented Islamophobia : Islam, State, and Governmentality in Indonesia ]]>
<![CDATA[Zuhri, Syaifudin]]>
<![CDATA[ QIJIS Vol 9, No 2 (2021) ]]>
Publisher : <![CDATA[IAIN Kudus ]]>
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DOI: 10.21043/qijis.v9i2.8249
<![CDATA[This article discusses the arts of governing Islam in Indonesia, a majority Muslim country, which is neither secular nor Islamic. It tries to explain how the premise of governmentality is modelled into the state structure and politics. Rather than seeing Islamophobia as a cultural practice, the article argues that Islamophobia develops partly because of power relations between the ruler and the ruled, or as I call it “regimented Islamophobiaâ€. It is the fear of “Islamic threats†– whether real or imagined – that is deemed as a potent challenge to regimes’ power and authority. While the notion of majority-minority relation remains essential to analyse the forms of Islamophobia, this article offers a new insight of how political regimes exercise “governmentality practices†or the arts of governing Islam and controlling Muslim aspirations. This practice of governmentality is a key strategy to pacify Islam during the colonial and post-colonial Indonesia. As far as Indonesian political history is concerned, this governmentality practice is old wine in a new bottle; it is the technique Dutch colonial government and the regimes following the Indonesian independence have exercised for subjugating Islam and controlling aspirations of its believers.]]>
<![CDATA[Niqab, Protest Movement, and the Salafization of Indonesian Islam ]]>
<![CDATA[Ahmad, Maghfur]]>;
<![CDATA[Muniroh, Siti Mumun]]>;
<![CDATA[Nurani, Shinta]]>
<![CDATA[ QIJIS Vol 9, No 2 (2021) ]]>
Publisher : <![CDATA[IAIN Kudus ]]>
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DOI: 10.21043/qijis.v9i2.8195
<![CDATA[This study aims to reveal the niqab as a protest movement and an instrument of regeneration (salafization) for Salafi Muslim women in Indonesia. The niqab has been one of the important symbols in the Salafi Islamic movement and has been the main dress for Salafi Muslim women. This study is of importance since the existing niqab studies are more related to religious identity, culture, motivation, stigma, and stereotypes. Data in this phenomenological research were obtained through interviews, observations, and documentation involving the niqab-wearing women from Salafi Islam activists at Majlis Ta’lim Al-Izzah of Pekalongan and Pondok Pesantren SJR Al-Salafy of Yogyakarta. The data were then analyzed with the Moustakas’ model. This study has shown that the niqab in the internal circle of Salafi Islam has a plural meaning. Among Salafi Muslims, it not only functions as a cultural identity or a symbol of piety in religion but also holds the spirit of protest, resistance, struggle, and an instrument of da’wah to expand the influence of Salafi ideology. That is, the niqab has become a symbol of resistance to both the hegemony of religiosity and the established dressing culture for Indonesian Muslim women. It is also a symbol of the struggle towards the kaffah Islam and an essential instrument for the regeneration of Salafi Islam. Overall, the niqab phenomenon in Indonesia indicates that the salafization in Indonesian Islam has been running in a structured, massive, and sustainable way.]]>
<![CDATA[Chinese Muslims’ Ways of Being Nationalist: Combining Islamic Cosmopolitanism, Acculturation and Social Roles ]]>
<![CDATA[Zuhri, Achmad Muhibin]]>;
<![CDATA[Wahyudi, Winarto Eka]]>;
<![CDATA[Hamid, Abdulloh]]>
<![CDATA[ QIJIS Vol 9, No 2 (2021) ]]>
Publisher : <![CDATA[IAIN Kudus ]]>
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DOI: 10.21043/qijis.v9i2.9649
<![CDATA[One of the ideas that should also be formalized in the reform movement in Indonesia is addressing the issue related to minority groups. Chinese group in Indonesia is one of civil groups that may experience discrimination to date. As a minority ethnic and Muslim community in Indonesia, Chinese Muslims are inevitably in a vulnerable position. They should prove their patriotism toward the nation, Indonesia. This research finds out that the Chinese have been a community that exists way before Indonesia gained its independence: some even play a significant role in Islamization. Chinese Muslims in Indonesia also contribute to establishing the concept of nationalism in Indonesia. Additionally, Chinese Muslims seem to be successful in contextualizing a more substantial concept of nationalism by positioning Chinese ethnic as a cultural entity, not as a representative of “other nation,†and by assimilating local Muslims to play various societal roles. Besides, Chinese Muslims also practice moderate Islamic values to emphasize that their values do not contradict the national values of Indonesia.]]>
<![CDATA[Regimented Islamophobia : Islam, State, and Governmentality in Indonesia ]]>
<![CDATA[Syaifudin Zuhri]]>
<![CDATA[ QIJIS Vol 9, No 2 (2021) ]]>
Publisher : <![CDATA[IAIN Kudus ]]>
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DOI: 10.21043/qijis.v9i2.8249
<![CDATA[This article discusses the arts of governing Islam in Indonesia, a majority Muslim country, which is neither secular nor Islamic. It tries to explain how the premise of governmentality is modelled into the state structure and politics. Rather than seeing Islamophobia as a cultural practice, the article argues that Islamophobia develops partly because of power relations between the ruler and the ruled, or as I call it “regimented Islamophobia”. It is the fear of “Islamic threats” – whether real or imagined – that is deemed as a potent challenge to regimes’ power and authority. While the notion of majority-minority relation remains essential to analyse the forms of Islamophobia, this article offers a new insight of how political regimes exercise “governmentality practices” or the arts of governing Islam and controlling Muslim aspirations. This practice of governmentality is a key strategy to pacify Islam during the colonial and post-colonial Indonesia. As far as Indonesian political history is concerned, this governmentality practice is old wine in a new bottle; it is the technique Dutch colonial government and the regimes following the Indonesian independence have exercised for subjugating Islam and controlling aspirations of its believers.]]>
<![CDATA[Niqab, Protest Movement, and the Salafization of Indonesian Islam ]]>
<![CDATA[Maghfur Ahmad]]>;
<![CDATA[Siti Mumun Muniroh]]>;
<![CDATA[Shinta Nurani]]>
<![CDATA[ QIJIS Vol 9, No 2 (2021) ]]>
Publisher : <![CDATA[IAIN Kudus ]]>
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DOI: 10.21043/qijis.v9i2.8195
<![CDATA[This study aims to reveal the niqab as a protest movement and an instrument of regeneration (salafization) for Salafi Muslim women in Indonesia. The niqab has been one of the important symbols in the Salafi Islamic movement and has been the main dress for Salafi Muslim women. This study is of importance since the existing niqab studies are more related to religious identity, culture, motivation, stigma, and stereotypes. Data in this phenomenological research were obtained through interviews, observations, and documentation involving the niqab-wearing women from Salafi Islam activists at Majlis Ta’lim Al-Izzah of Pekalongan and Pondok Pesantren SJR Al-Salafy of Yogyakarta. The data were then analyzed with the Moustakas’ model. This study has shown that the niqab in the internal circle of Salafi Islam has a plural meaning. Among Salafi Muslims, it not only functions as a cultural identity or a symbol of piety in religion but also holds the spirit of protest, resistance, struggle, and an instrument of da’wah to expand the influence of Salafi ideology. That is, the niqab has become a symbol of resistance to both the hegemony of religiosity and the established dressing culture for Indonesian Muslim women. It is also a symbol of the struggle towards the kaffah Islam and an essential instrument for the regeneration of Salafi Islam. Overall, the niqab phenomenon in Indonesia indicates that the salafization in Indonesian Islam has been running in a structured, massive, and sustainable way.]]>
<![CDATA[Chinese Muslims’ Ways of Being Nationalist: Combining Islamic Cosmopolitanism, Acculturation and Social Roles ]]>
<![CDATA[Achmad Muhibin Zuhri]]>;
<![CDATA[Winarto Eka Wahyudi]]>;
<![CDATA[Abdulloh Hamid]]>
<![CDATA[ QIJIS Vol 9, No 2 (2021) ]]>
Publisher : <![CDATA[IAIN Kudus ]]>
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DOI: 10.21043/qijis.v9i2.9649
<![CDATA[One of the ideas that should also be formalized in the reform movement in Indonesia is addressing the issue related to minority groups. Chinese group in Indonesia is one of civil groups that may experience discrimination to date. As a minority ethnic and Muslim community in Indonesia, Chinese Muslims are inevitably in a vulnerable position. They should prove their patriotism toward the nation, Indonesia. This research finds out that the Chinese have been a community that exists way before Indonesia gained its independence: some even play a significant role in Islamization. Chinese Muslims in Indonesia also contribute to establishing the concept of nationalism in Indonesia. Additionally, Chinese Muslims seem to be successful in contextualizing a more substantial concept of nationalism by positioning Chinese ethnic as a cultural entity, not as a representative of “other nation,” and by assimilating local Muslims to play various societal roles. Besides, Chinese Muslims also practice moderate Islamic values to emphasize that their values do not contradict the national values of Indonesia.]]>
